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1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the education production function is a central goal of much research in education. 
Recent studies have analysed many components of this including the impact of class size, teacher 
quality, other school resources, peer groups, cognitive skills, family income, parental human capital 
and so on. The factor that we analyse here has received comparatively little attention, despite the 
fact that it is perhaps the one that the student herself focuses on most – her effort in studying is one 
of the few aspects of educational attainment actually under her own control. Does it matter? Does 
studying hard pay off? Data and identification problems are undoubtedly a major constraint: causal 
analysis of the impact of student effort on educational attainment requires an exogenous change in 
the marginal value of leisure or effort. This paper attempts to quantify how much student effort 
matters to educational achievement. 
We use a sharp, exogenous and repeated change in the value of leisure to identify the impact of 
student  effort  on  educational  performance.  Performance  is  measured  using  the  universal  high-
stakes  tests  that  students  in  schools  in  England  take  at  the  end  of  compulsory  schooling.  The 
treatment  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  world’s  two  most-watched  international  football 
tournaments (the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA European Championships) overlap with the exam 
period in schools in England, well known to be a nation obsessed with football. These tournaments 
are both attention-grabbing and highly salient for many students; they substantially raise the value 
of  leisure  time  for many students  and  so  are  likely  to  reduce effort.  They  happen  every  other 
summer, so each year is sequentially either a treatment year or a control year. Because of the nature 
of  the  treatment  and  our  data,  we  can  implement  a  clean  difference-in-difference  design.  We 
compare within-student variation in performance during the exam period between tournament and 
non-tournament years using seven years of student-subject data on practically all the students in 
England. This data allows us to bring out the heterogeneity of impact as well as quantifying the 
average effect.  
In some ways, the treatment is ideal for a causal study. Exposure to the treatment is random: 
whether a particular student is born in an even year or an odd year. Neither students nor schools 
can affect the timing of the exams, which are always scheduled for the same period each year. The 
maximum potential treatment is very strong, as detailed below: the tournament always completely 
dominates TV, radio and other media during the weeks it takes place.  Because we do not observe 
actual hours spent thinking about the tournament, this is an intention to treat study, and actual 
treatment  depends  on  an  individual’s  interest  in  football;  our  data  allow  us  to  estimate  the   3 
heterogeneity of effects. Another benefit of this dataset relative to other studies is that student 
effort is not confounded with teacher effort. There is no teaching at this time, leaving the student 
time to revise. 
The key high-stakes examinations in England (called the General Certificate in Secondary Education 
or GCSE) are achievement tests, testing both knowledge and ability. They account for half of the final 
subject grade on average, and are always scheduled for May and June at the end of compulsory 
schooling (at age 16). We obtained data on exam timetables for each subject, and compare with the 
tournament dates. A proportion of exams overlap with these major football tournaments, and this 
generates within-student variation in tournament years.  
We find a significant negative average effect of the tournament on exam performance, substantial 
for some groups. The mean deterioration in grades for subjects with exams during the tournament 
relative to earlier subjects is 0.063 standard deviations (SD)s of student performance. For highly 
affected  groups  such  as  male  students
1, from di sadvantaged families and of Black Caribbean 
heritage, the effect size is 0.1 0 SDs.   Thus the overlap of exams and the tournaments reduces 
average attainment and raises educational inequality.  In fact, since the summer exams only count 
for around half of the grade on average, the impact of the effort reduction directly on the exam 
score is about double these numbers.  We consider the implications of these results  for the role of 
effort in educational production in the Conclusion.  
Our results contribute to the interpretation of two recent strands of work: the importance of non -
cognitive  and  cognitive  traits,  and  the  effect  of  differences  in  school  ethos  on  educational 
attainment.  Firstly, a  great deal of work has investigated the role of non -cognitive factors  in 
educational attainment, alongside cognitive ability (see Cunha et al, 2010). Non-cognitive factors can 
be identified with personality traits (Heckman, 2011), and one of the ‘big 5’ personality traits is 
‘conscientiousness’, with the related traits of self-control, accepting  delayed gratification, and a 
strong work ethic (Heckman, 2011, p. 5); it is also related to the rate of time preference (Daly et al, 
2009). Conscientiousness has been shown to be an excellent predictor of educational attainment 
and course grades (Almlund et al 2011, Borghans et al 2011). These aspects of self control and ability 
to concentrate are clearly related to the broad notion of effort we are using here. Our results add to 
this literature by isolating the effect of decisions on effort and time allocation in addition to the 
general ability to concentrate and exert self-control. The latter are differenced out in our design, 
leaving  just  the  effect  of  differences  in  the  contemporaneous  value  of  leisure  to  influence 
achievement scores.  
                                                           
1 An interest in football is in general more highly concentrated among males and lower socio-economic status groups in 
Europe than it is in the US.   4 
Secondly, the work of Abdulkadiroglu et al (2011), Angrist et al (2010, 2011a, 2011b) and Dobbie and 
Fryer (2009) have focussed attention on “No Excuses” schools in the KIPP network or in the Harlem 
Children’s Zone. These schools all feature a long school day, a longer school year, very selective 
teacher recruitment, strong norms of behaviour, as well as other characteristics. Estimates of their 
impact on attainment, using lotteries as an identification strategy, show very powerful effects. This 
aggregate effect could be due to different aspects of the KIPP/HCZ ethos, but part of it is very likely 
to be increased effort from the students. Our results complement this by showing the impact of just 
a change in effort, and that that can have very substantial effects.  
Other  studies  have  addressed  how  effort  matters  for  educational  attainment.  Stinebrickner  & 
Stinebrickner (2008) found that randomly being assigned to a college roommate who has a video 
game console significantly reduces time allocated to studying (using self-completed surveys), which 
then negatively impacts on educational attainment. They use the roommate with the video console 
as an instrument to establish the causal impact of effort on attainment. The estimated effect may 
include peer effects as well as the changing marginal value of leisure. There is mixed evidence that 
class attendance at higher education is positively related to student performance
2. These studies do 
not have clear identification strategies to demonstrate the marginal  causal impact of changing the 
incentives of either effort or leisure. Using a birth cohort, de Fraja et al (2010) provide a theoretical 
and empirical model to test the impact of student, parent and teacher effort on attainment in the 
United Kingdom. Using the National Child Database Survey, they find that the students’ and parents’ 
effort are complements, and both seem more important to attainment than teacher effort. Effort 
and  educational  attainment  are  self-reported,  and  the  former  is  based  on  a  host  of  subjective 
variables about schoolwork, parents’ involvement in that schoolwork, and teacher involvement.  
There is a small but growing literature within education on incentivising students to raise effort. 
Experiments in these studies increase the relative marginal value of effort over leisure. There have 
been  some  studies  showing  substantial  positive  effects  of  financial  incentives  on 
primary/elementary and secondary/high school students (Angrist et al, 2002; Henry & Rubinstein, 
2002; Jackson, 2010; Kremer et al, 2009; Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Dearden et al, 2009; Dee, 2011; 
Pallais,  2009),  although  others  demonstrate  a  lack  of  positive  effects  of  financial  incentives  in 
educational attainment (Bettinger, 2010; Sharma, 2010; Fryer, 2010; and Rodriguez-Panas, 2010). 
Recent research from Levitt et al (2011a;b) show that financial incentives can increase attainment 
                                                           
2 Some correlational studies found increased study time, and hence effort, to be associated with higher educational 
attainment (Schmidt, 1983; Michaels and Miethe, 1989; Douglas and Sulock, 1995; Young et al, 2003; and George et al 
2008)), whereas others find no correlation (Park and Kerr, 1990; Nonis and Hudson, 2006) or even a negative ccorrelation 
(Krohn and O’Connor, 2005).   5 
across all age categories, and very short-term incentives are particularly important in increasing 
examination performance. 
More specifically, there is little evidence of how sporting events, that are not part of the traditional 
human capital production function, impact on attainment.
3 Other areas of life have been examined: 
Lozano (2008) considers the impact of the World Cup on the time use of adult male Americans.  
The next section  describes  the English education system and  our data.  Section 3 sets out the 
framework underlying our approach, identification and selection issues.  We present our results in 
section 4 and section 5 discusses the implications of our results.   
2. Data 
 
Compulsory  education  in  England  lasts  for  11  years,  in  primary  school  from  age  5  to  11,  and 
secondary school from age 11 to 16.  Teaching is organised around four Keystages, Key Stage 1 (KS1) 
up until age 7, KS2 to age 11, KS3 to age 14 and KS4 to age 16.  There is essentially no grade 
repetition in England, each pupil moves up to the next school year each year. Each Keystage finishes 
with compulsory tests (though KS3 tests were recently discontinued). The KS4 exams at age 16, more 
widely known as GCSEs, are high stakes, crucial for continuing in school or looking for jobs. These 
exams are the focus of our empirical work.  
Students take on average around eight subjects at GCSE, and most students will attempt at least 
five. Among these, English, maths and science are compulsory; others are optional chosen from a 
long list of possibilities, which will vary by school.  These subjects are studied for two years up to the 
summer exams.  
a. Timing of Football Tournaments and Exams 
 
Every four years (on even years) the FIFA World Cup takes place in June and July, and every other 
four  years  (on  the  different  even  years,  so  always  two  years  apart)  the  UEFA  European 
                                                           
3 There is research that demonstrates that the impact of participation in sport is beneficial for educational attainment. 
There is some evidence from the United States that being involved in sport has a positive association with educational and 
labor market success (see for example Hanks, 1979; Long & Caudill, 1991; Maloney & McCormick, 1993; Barron et al., 2000; 
Eide & Ronan, 2001; Cornelißen & Pfeifer, 2010; Stevenson, 2010; Lechner, 2009). While there seems to be some positive 
impacts of  participating  in sport on education, the actual interest in  sport on effort and educational attainment has 
received little attention.    6 
Championships also take place in June and July.
4 The FIFA World Cup attracts a massive worldwide 
audience. For instance, the 2006 World Cup in Germany  had television coverage in 214 countries 
around the world, with 73,000 hours of dedicated programming, which generated a total cumulative 
television audience of 26.29 billion people (FIFA, 2007). The UEFA European Championships are not 
as large as the World Cup, although the 2008 Euro tournament  was watched live by at least 155 
million TV viewers, and the final round of the tournament was shown in a total of 231 countries 
(UEFA, 2008).  
Appendix Table 1 reports the time frame for  the World Cups and European Championships from 
2002 to 2008 (the years for which we have individual educational attainment scores in England). The 
English national football team qualified for  the first three of these four international tournaments, 
but not for the 2008 European Championships
5. We therefore classify 2008 as a “non-tournament” 
year, supported by the TV viewing data discussed below, but we test the robustness of our results to 
this decision.  
In each of these years, the tournament overlapped with national UK examinations. We report the 
GCSE examination start dates and end dates in Appendix Table 2. There is no difference in exam 
dates between those years in which there is a football tournament and those years in which there is 
not. The proportion of exams during the football tournament ranges between 46% and 61%. The 
data on examination dates for each subject were obtained from Cambridge Examinations. Although 
different examination boards set their own exams, the exams of different boards for the same 
subject across the country are on the same day. The list of subjects used in our analysis is provided 
in Appendix Table 3. Some subjects have no exams during the tournament, others have a proportion 
of exams during the football period, and others have all the exams during the football period. Using 
the exact date of examination we calculate a variable that has the proportion of exams that are 
within the time period of the football tournament.  
b. Pupil Data 
 
The data on pupils are taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD). The NPD is an administrative 
dataset of all pupils in the state‐maintained system, some 93% of all pupils,  made available to 
researchers by the Department for Education. It includes a census of pupils, taken each year in 
January, from 2002 onwards. In each cohort there is approximately half a million pupils, and so over 
                                                           
4 The history and background to the FIFA World Cup and European Championships can be found at 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/ and http://www.uefa.com/ respectively.  
5 As some readers may know, England did not progress very far through the knock-out stages of any of these tournaments. 
We considered whether we could differentiate between exams sat before and after England were eliminated, but in fact 
the team did manage to remain in the tournament for almost all the exam period.   7 
the seven year period we use, 2002 – 2008, we have some 3.5 million pupils. We have data on each 
student’s gender, within‐year age, ethnicity, an indicator of Special Educational Needs (SEN, which 
measures learning or behavioural difficulties), and eligibility for Free School Meals (FSM), which is 
dependent on eligibility for welfare benefits and is widely used as a measure of family poverty. 
This census of personal characteristics can be linked to each pupil’s test score history. Our analysis 
uses the subset of pupils that are identifiable within the state system throughout this period, which 
amounts to 90% of the cohort
6.  
Our outcome variable is the pupil’s performance in the high-stakes exams at the end of compulsory 
schooling at age 16, called GCSEs. These exams are nationally set and marked, and are marked 
remotely and independently from the school. Very few students resit exams, so there is almost 
always just the one grade per student per subject. The overall mark distribution is not normed each 
year, the average grade has been increasing year on year, which we control through common year 
effects. The structure of the attainment data is as follows: exams are nested within subjects which 
are nested within students. Students have grades for around 7 to 8 subjects
7 on average. Each of 
these subjects is graded in the same way, from  A* to fail, and we assign numerical values to these 
letter grades  using the  National Curriculum points system.  Each subject is assessed through a 
number of different instruments including typically a number of separate exams and coursework. 
The different exams for a subject are  spread over a number of different days; on average, 
coursework contributes about half of the final grade, and we return to this when quantifying our 
results in section 4.e below.  
We know each student’s result in each subject, but the results for each individual exam are not 
available
8. We know the date of each individual exam so we are able to characterise the degree of 
overlap between exams and the tournament for each subject. So while we cannot connect the date 
of a specific exam to the mark on a specific exam, we can relate the mark on a subject to the degree 
of overlap of the exams in that subject with the tournament. 
We normalise the scores separately for each subject to remove any differences in subject difficulty; 
obviously the normalisation is done over all the years together as our focus is on across-year within-
subject variation.  Some  analyses  below  use  the  student’s  overall  mean  exam  score;  for  those 
analyses, we normalise the total score to a mean zero and SD of one. The SD of subject level scores 
                                                           
6 Those that are excluded may have attended a private school for a period, may have spent time abroad (including Wales 
or Scotland), or may have been entirely educated in the English state system but their Unique Pupil Number was lost 
during a school transfer. 
7 We collapse Science entries to one subject. 
8 This rules out an even more fine-grained analysis, for example looking at the exam score the day after an important 
match.    8 
and the SD of student averages over the subjects they take are about the same. The latter is only 
about 7.5% lower because a student’s scores on all the subjects s/he takes are highly correlated.  
As a measure of prior attainment, we use data on tests taken at age 11, Keystage 2 tests (KS2) in 
English, Maths and Science. These are compulsory for all students, and are also set and marked at a 
national level, remote from the school. One important and useful feature is that these tests are 
always taken in early May so are unaffected by the tournament taking place.  
Table 1 provides an overview of our data. The basic facts are that around 12% of students are 
eligible for FSM, and around 85% of the students are white. For some analyses we take a subset of 
students who take both “late” and “early” exams, and we these account for 81.4% of our overall 
data. This subset differs a little: those students taking only “early” exams are slightly more likely to 
be poor, and have slightly lower prior attainment. Since the compulsory subjects have “early” exams, 
there are no students only taking “late” exams.  
c. Television Viewing Data 
 
TV viewing data provide useful support for our assumption that watching the major international 
football  tournaments  is  a  very  widespread  phenomenon.  The  Broadcasters’  Audience  Research 
Board (www.barb.co.uk) provides weekly data on the viewing figures of the top 30 programmes per 
channel.  
First, we show in Appendix table 4 how football programmes dominate the list of top programmes 
watched in this window. Football programmes are by far the most popular thing on television across 
the tournament period for all years, and more people watch BBC and ITV during football periods. 
Second we show in Figure 1 the big changes in TV viewing habits between June and April over our 
sample period. People generally watch much less TV in June, but in football tournament years, June 
viewing  is  considerably  higher.  This  difference–in–difference  in  viewing  habits  supports  our 
interpretation of the difference-in-difference in educational outcomes below, with peaks in 2002, 
2004 and 2006. It also supports our assignment of 2008 as a non-tournament year.  The observation 
for 2007 is rather out of line, but this seems to be due to an abnormally hot April that year reducing 
TV viewing then.  
Watching television is the third most important activity (in terms of duration) that children over age 
12 take part in (see Hofferth & Sandberg, 2001). In Europe, young people in lower SES families spend 
more  time  watching  TV  than  higher  SES  families  (Wartella,  1995;  Hofferth  &  Sandberg,  2001),   9 
especially TV for entertainment (Hudson et al, 1999). Boys (aged 12 to 17) seem to watch more TV 
than similar aged girls (Robinson & Bianchi, 1997; Frederick, 1995).  
3. Identification strategy 
 
We set out a framework for the empirical work, to highlight the sources of identification in the 
different approaches we take below.  We then discuss selection issues that might provide a threat to 
identification. 
a. Empirical Framework  
 
The central idea is that the football tournaments dramatically raise the value of leisure time for 
some people, and correspondingly reduce the value of all other time uses. One of these time uses 
for students is the effort put into studying. Effort is to be understood in a broad sense as the number 
of hours spent preparing for the exams; this might include making the effort to ignore distractions 
and  to  create  an  environment  to  concentrate  on  study.  We  conjecture  that  the  amount  of 
productive study time is reduced both in the build-up to the tournament and then more significantly 
once the matches are under way.  
A simple model of student effort is as follows. The level of educational attainment, as reflected in an 
exam result, is q. We assume that students value higher levels of attainment more highly because of 
the  expected  impact  on  future  lifetime  income,  denoted  V(q).  Students  exert  effort,  e,  when 
studying  for  their  examinations,  which  has  a  utility  cost,     ,  increasing  and  convex  in  effort. 
Students  have  an  underlying  level  of  ability,  a.  Attainment  is  produced  by  ability  and  effort: 
          . Student i will choose ei to maximise                    . Optimal effort is the value of 
e that solves:   
    
           
    , allowing all of the functions to vary by student.  
Taking these components one by one, the effort function is central. The major cost of effort is the 
value  of  the  leisure  time  forgone  to  undertake  study.  We  assume  that  this  may  depend  on 
observable individual characteristics such as gender, age, family background, denoted Zi, and an 
unobservable individual component, i. The key factor for this paper is that the value of leisure 
increases for some individuals when a major football tournament takes place. We allow this impact 
of the tournament on the value of leisure to vary by individual, i. This taste for watching football 
will depend on cultural factors and an idiosyncratic component, which we expect to be substantial. 
The cultural factors may be associated with observable student characteristics, for example gender,   10 
ethnicity, social class, and location. An interest in football is by no means confined to men, but in 
England it remains a bigger part of male culture than female culture. Football has also been more 
associated with lower income and working class families (see Baker, 1979; Goldblatt, 2006). It may 
also matter whether a pupil lives in an urban or rural area since football is generally a city sport.  
We denote the incidence of the tournament by the indicator terms I(t = T) and I(m = T);  that is: it is a 
tournament year, t, and that the tournament is actually taking place at the time of the relevant 
exam, m. We might expect an increase in the value of leisure in a tournament year even before the 
matches begin because of all the media attention and build up (denoted   
 ), but we expect a larger 
impact  once  the  tournament  is  actually  under  way  (denoted    
 ).  So  the  overall  cost  of  effort 
function for student  i at time t is:   
                  
                 
                         : 
effort depends on observable and unobservable student characteristics, and the individual impact of 
the tournament on the value of leisure, distinguishing between the general build-up and the actual 
coverage. This is a very flexible formulation.  
The attainment technology, the impact of revision time and effort on the qualification gained, will 
also likely vary by student observable and unobservable characteristics, i, and possibly by school, si. 
We allow for the possibility that the exam setting and marking may vary year-by-year by including 
year effects, t; these will net out of within-student estimates. We also allow student performance to 
vary through the exam period. There are many possibilities: for example, it may be that students 
learn and improve their exam technique as time goes by; or it could be that students tire and do 
worse on later exams; or it could be that later exams provide less time for last-minute revision; or it 
could be that, anticipating this, students over-revise for the later exams. In any case, we allow for 
unrestricted, idiosyncratic within-period time dummies, m. This is all summarised in the attainment 
function:    
                             .  Conditional  on  what  the  student  writes  down  in  her 
exams, there is nothing in the setting or marking of the exams that could vary between tournament 
and non-tournament years beyond general time trends
9.   
The student’s valuation of the qualifications,   
  , may also depend on the same observable individual 
characteristics, Zi, and an unobservable factor, i.  
Optimal effort chosen by the student depends on all these factors. Inserting these back into the 
attainment function gives the exam outcome. We allow for interactions so that the impact on the 
exam of an hour of study effort may depend on ability. Assuming a linear form we arrive at our 
empirical formulation: 
                                                           
9 The exam marking occurs after the tournament is over.   11 
                                                                      
                    
     
                                                (1) 
Where    combines i, i and i, plus any unmeasured aspects of ability (and also absorbs the school 
effect, si), and      is a noise term.  In the results reported below, we also allow     
      to depend 
on Zi.   
In summary, the impact of the tournament on exam performance depends on the effect of the 
tournament on any reduction in study time (in turn depending on the student’s taste for watching 
football), and the effectiveness of study time in raising exam scores (depending on the student’s 
ability).  
b. Selection away from late exams 
 
It would be potentially problematic if some students avoided taking  optional subjects with late 
exams in tournament years. Even so, our conditional within-student difference should take out any 
first order effect of differences in unobservable student characteristics.  
We compared the prior attainment and other characteristics of students picking late or early options 
in tournament and non-tournament years. We run a difference-in-difference, comparing the mean 
ability of students taking late options with those taking early options, and then difference that 
difference across T and NT years. Taking the student’s average KS2 score as the measure of prior 
ability, the results show no effect. The diff-in-diff coefficient is positive, but only 0.001 of an SD and 
not significantly different from zero (even in a regression of 12.2m observations). So if the counter-
story  is  that  unobservably  smarter  pupils  switch  out  of  late  options  in  anticipation  of  the 
tournament/exam clash some two and half years ahead, this is not supported by the evidence on 
observed ability.   
In any case, there are reasons to believe this sort of selection not to be a serious issue.  First, 
subjects are chosen over two years in advance of the exam period. While obviously the occurrence 
of the football tournaments is fully predictable, potential differential overlap of this with the exams 
is probably not a major reason for subject choice. Second, exam dates change, so even if students 
were  attempting  to  strategise  this  they  would  be  unable  to  do  so  perfectly.  The  exams  varied 
between early and late for around half of all subjects over this period.  
   12 
4. Results 
 
We structure our results as follows. First, we present the simple aggregate time series story. Second, 
we look at simple differences between tournament and non-tournament years for matched groups 
of students. This gives an overall picture of the effect of tournaments but is vulnerable to being 
confounded with other year to year effects. So next we analyse within-individual differences and 
compare the distribution of these between tournament and non-tournament years. These provide 
our main results. This is an intention to treat study as we are estimating the effect of the potential 
treatment available. Fourth, we present robustness checks, and finally consider the effect size we 
have estimated relative to other education factors impacting on student performance.  
Heterogeneity  of  response  is  likely  to  be  very  important  in  this  context  so  in  our  results  we 
emphasise the distribution of effects as much as the average. The effect we estimate depends on the 
change in the value of leisure time once the World Cup or European Championships is under way, 
and the impact of any reduction in study time on exam scores. The former at least is very likely to 
vary between students in a number of unobserved dimensions, and part of the role played by the 
observable characteristics of the students in the analysis is capturing a high or low interest in the 
tournament.  
The  most  aggregate  piece  of  evidence  is  the  time  series  available  on  national  average  GCSE 
performance, which  includes  both  state  and  private  education.  We  focus on  the  percentage  of 
students obtaining at least five good passes each year (grade C or higher) and Figure 2 plots the 
annual percentage change in this aggregate data from 1990 to 2008, with the tournament years 
highlighted.  The  visual  impression  that  tournament  years  are  associated  with  lower  growth  is 
supported by the means: a mean increase of 1.49 percentage points in tournament years against 
1.63 in non-football years. However, this is just eighteen observations. 
a. Simple differences across years 
 
We now exploit the pupil-level data, and start with simple differences: how students perform in 
tournament years against a similar set of students in non-tournament years. Each student is only 
present in one year, so we must compare groups of students across years. From our model, it is clear 
that a simple difference incorporates the pre-tournament build-up effect and the effect during the 
tournament itself. It also includes factors from the possibly-differing populations in tournament and 
non-tournament  years  and  any  differences  in  the  general  year  dummies,  so  it  is  not  cleanly 
identifying the effect of the tournament; that is in the following sub-section.   13 
We first simply split our data up by gender, poverty status and ability (prior test performance), and 
tabulate for each of those groups the mean GCSE score in tournament-years minus the mean GCSE 
score in non-tournament-years, in student-level SD units
10. The results are in Table 2. For example, 
taking  high  ability  non-poor  boys, we see that this group typically score 0.0 49  SDs lower in 
tournament  years than non-tournament  years. Across the table,  about half  of the entries are 
negative. The metric in this table is student-level SDs of GCSE scores.  The magnitude of these effects 
is therefore not negligible.  Comparing the column averages, there are negative averages for three of 
the four groups, larger for boys than girls. There is generally a greater difference for poor boys than 
non-poor boys. The overall row averages show  a negative average for high ability students, and a 
positive effect for low ability students. But as is clear from our model, there are a  number of other 
factors confounding the effect of the tournament in this analysis, and we turn to the difference -in-
difference to identify the tournament effect itself.  
b. Difference-in-Differences across years and exam timing 
 
A difference-in-difference analysis deals with this problem. Using our data on the timing of the 
exams and of the tournaments, we define ‘late’ subjects and ‘early’ subjects. In tournament years, 
late subjects are those  in which at least  two thirds of the exams are on dates overlapping the 
tournament, and early subjects are the rest. In non-tournament years, we take the same calendar 
dates in the tournament years to define late subjects.  This allows us to compare performance in late 
and  early  exams  within  a  year.    As  we  noted  above,  it  is  likely  that  there  will  differences  in 
performance on subjects late in the exam period versus early in the period for a number of reasons. 
We control for this and look for any differences in late - early performance gradients in tournament 
years. 
For each pupil in each year, we define a late – early difference as the student’s mean score over 
her/his late subjects minus her/his mean score over the early subjects. This is defined for the 82% of 
students with both late and early subjects. From (1), the expected late – early difference in a non-
tournament  year  is simply:                                                           ,  all observed  and 
unobserved individual characteristics drop out, the year effect drops out leaving only that student’s 
idiosyncratic performance change through the exam time. In tournament years, it is the same plus 
the impact of the tournament whilst it is in progress,      
     . This permits a straightforward 
difference-in-difference to identify the effect of the tournament. 
                                                           
10 We take out a common linear time trend, because GCSE results have trended up over our sample of years. This is the 
only analysis that we need to do this as all later analyses are based on within-student differences.   14 
We compare the distribution of this gradient in tournament and non-tournament years in Figure 3. 
We see a wide range of outcomes, but that the weight of the distribution is above zero, that is, that 
somewhat more students perform better in late subjects than early ones. The figure also shows a 
difference between tournament and non-tournament years: the latter curve is shifted to the right, 
that is, the typical late-early gradient is lower in years when football tournaments are staged. 
We use a regression analysis to summarise the differences in the distribution across tournament and 
non-tournament years. We run a regression of the gradient on observable characteristics, a dummy 
for whether it is a tournament year, and the interaction of the tournament dummy with all the 
observable characteristics, all with and without school fixed effects.  We cluster standard errors at 
school level. The results are in Table 3.  
Column 1 shows that the mean late-early difference is lower by 0.063 SDs in tournament years
11, 
and is unchanged by adding school fixed effects in column 3. Both these estimates are conditional on 
all  our observable student  characteristics  (coefficients  not  reported).  Both  are very  precisely 
estimated. We return to the quantitative significance below, but this is not trivial in magnitude.  
Columns  2  and  4  introduce  interactions  of  the  observable  student  characteristics  and  the 
tournament indicator. Only a selection of interactions are reported in the Table and there are few 
other effects that are consistently significant across columns 2 and  4: students of Asian ethnicity 
other than Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Chinese have a significant negative effect; students of 
mixed white and Black Caribbean ethnicity a significant positive effect; students with special needs a 
consistent negative  effect. The strongest single interaction is with gender: the impact of the 
tournament is greater in absolute terms by 0.025 SDs for males. This result ties in with the evidence 
noted above on relative TV viewing by gender and the much greater interest in football of boys than 
girls in England. Note, however, that the effect is statistically and quantitatively significant for female 
students too. Students from poor families also experience an additional negative impact of the 
tournament, adding 0.019 SDs in absolute terms to the base effect.   
These effects are plausibly interpreted as mainly picking up cultural differences, as proxying a strong 
interest in watching the football tournament. But as we noted the impact of the tournament on 
exam scores in our model is the product of fewer hours of study and the effectiveness of those lost 
                                                           
11 The tournament dummy is a linear combination of year dummies. Simply including a tournament dummy and omitting 
two year dummies obviously means that the reported tournament effect depends on which years are omitted. So to avoid 
an ad hoc choice, we decided to include a full set of dummies (omitting the constant) and compute the tournament effect 
as: ((d2002+d2004+d2006)/3) – (d2003+d2005+d2007+d2008)/4) and test whether this is different from zero. This is the 
standard error and significance level reported in the table. Note that the dependent variable is within-student late-early 
variation, so this is not capturing general drifts in average marks. We have also re-run the analysis with no year dummies at 
all and get similar results.    15 
hours. The latter will depend on the student’s ability, and the table shows results that confirm this 
view. Conditional on the other interactions, high ability students tend to suffer a higher penalty than 
the base effect, and low ability students less so. The extra hours of study lost due to the tournament 
are particularly costly to high ability students. Of course, ability is also likely to be correlated with 
cultural factors, but these effects appear to be swamped by the effectiveness factor.  
We can display the differences between groups less parametrically by simply calculating the mean 
difference-in-difference for each of the groups we defined in Table 2. Table 4 reports the mean with 
the results of this calculation for the same simple twelve sub-groups as in Table 2. This is the average 
over all students in the group of their score in late exams in tournament years minus the mean score 
in early exams in tournament years, relative to the same calculation for non-tournament years. All 
the numbers are negative in the Table, and all are precisely defined and significantly different from 
zero. The size of the effects match up very well with the regression results in Table 3. The patterns 
across groups show bigger effects for boys than girls, bigger effects for disadvantaged groups, and a 
u-shape in ability, with the least effect in the middle group.  
c. Difference-in-Differences across years and exam timing within matched 
school-groups 
 
We can exploit the large dataset to allow more of the response heterogeneity to be examined. We 
match groups at a very fine level, exploiting our very large and quite rich data. We match within 
school (around 2000 schools), and using the key observables of student gender, FSM status, prior 
attainment group
12, ethnic group
13 and quarter of birth. So each student in a tournament year is 
matched with a student in a non-tournament year in the same school and defined by the same set of 
observables. We take the mean (late exam score – early exam score) difference for each student, 
and then average this within each school*observables group, separately for tournament and non-
tournament years, and analyse the difference. 
Under  our  model  (1),  the  within-individual  difference  removes  all  observable  and  unobservable 
individual characteristics, the year dummies and the effect of the general tournament build-up. The 
second  difference  across  matched  school-groups  yields  their  mean  direct  tournament  impact, 
                    , plus any residual mean differences in unobservables across tournament years within our 
matched  school*groups.  The  only  threat  to  identification  would  be  if,  for  example,  the  mean 
unobservable characteristics for poor, white, middle ability boys born in the first quarter of the year 
                                                           
12 We use three broad groups, working below the expected level (Keystage 2 score below 27), working at the expected 
level (KS2 of 27), or above the expected level. 
13 We use four aggregated groups: White, Black, Asian and Other.   16 
and attending a specific school differed significantly between the years (2002, 2004, 2006) and the 
years (2003, 2005, 2007, 2008), and differed in a way correlated with tournament years across the 
400,000 school*groups. 
To illustrate the heterogeneity of the impact Table 5 shows selected quantiles from the distribution 
of this difference-in-difference across some 15,000 school-groups with at least 40 students in. The 
overall median effect is 0.049 SDs. This is different to the equivalent regression value in Table 3 
because that comes from an individual-level regression and the median is not weighted by school-
group size; the weighted mean is -0.054.  
But the focus of this table is the extremes not the average. The table reveals that some experience a 
very substantial effect. For example, 10% of groups have an effect more negative than -0.26 SDs. The 
10
th percentile for male students is -0.28 SDs and for disadvantaged students is -0.35 SDs.  
We  establish  the  statistical  significance  of  the  tournament  effect  within  these  matched  school-
groups as follows. Where i denotes student, s school, and g group, we run the following regression 
separately  within  each  group:                                                                    .  And 
focus on the coefficients bg.  The within-student difference removes individual factors, the school 
fixed effects mean we are working off within-school differences between T and NT years, and the 
separate regressions by group mean we are comparing similar students.  
The value of b for each of the 192 groups is plotted, ranked, in Figure 4, with standard error bars. 
The Figure shows that the great majority of groups see a reduction in the late-early performance 
gradient in tournament years. About half of the groups see a decline greater than 0.05 SDs and an 
important number of groups experience impacts greater than 0.1 SDs. A much smaller number of 
groups  see  positive  impacts,  but  none  of  these  are  significant.  The  size  of  the  standard  errors 
depends on group size, but of the 192 groups, the coefficient is significantly negative (at 5%) in 104 
and significantly positive in none. The 104 groups are the largest groups and cover 91% of students.  
The Figure displays in sub-panels the variation within gender groups, within poverty status, ability 
and ethnicity groups
14. The groups ranked within gender show that  throughout the range, the  x-
ranked make group is more affected than the x-ranked female group, with a roughly constant gap 
between them. The great majority of both groups see a negative effect. The sub-panel splitting by 
poverty status shows that the most affected poor groups suffer a greater impact than the most 
affected non-poor groups, though for much of the range, the two groups experience broadly similar 
levels  of  impact.  In  the  sub-panel  by  ability,  the  three  lines  are  generally  not  far  apart.  What 
                                                           
14 We take out the otherwise-equivalent groups to those missing for the other subsets – so for example, if 
poor*females*high ability*white*first qtr birth is missing, we delete the same non-poor group.    17 
differences there are suggest that the middle ability group experiences the least impact among all 
but the most affected groups. The high ability groups see the greatest impact throughout almost all 
the distribution.  
d. Robustness checks 
 
We review the sensitivity of our results to a number of the data issues we have dealt with. First, 
instead  of  defining  “late”  subjects  as  those  in  which  two  thirds  of  exams  overlapped  with  the 
tournament, we used a half as the cut-off. The average effect is still strongly negative, but as this 
definition is less sharp, employing this produces a lower estimated effect of the tournament: an 
overall average of -0.038 in the equivalent of Table 4 rather than -0.056. There is also less of a 
distinction between the genders.  
Second, it is possible in the English system to sit exams a year earlier than the age-correct year. This 
is not uncommon in maths, and fairly rare in other subjects. If we drop students who sit maths early, 
the point estimate is unchanged at -0.056. 
Third, we counted the year 2008 as a non-tournament year for students in England as the national 
team did not qualify for the European Championships. This decision was based in part on the TV 
viewing figures in Figure 1. If instead we designate it as a tournament year, we estimate a reduced 
negative effect for boys, and a positive effect for girls. It is unfortunate that the ambiguous status of  
this year coincides with it being a year when one of the compulsory subjects, science, switches from 
being ‘early’ to being ‘late’, giving that year some leverage. If we drop all science results from the 
estimation and compare taking 2008 as a tournament and non-tournament year, the estimation of 
the tournament effect barely changes.  
Fourth,  we  can  extend  the  simple  dichotomous  early/late  subject  variable  and  construct  a 
continuous variable from the exam timetable information.  The variable Pitz is the proportion of 
examinations in subject z that are taken during the tournament period by student i in year t. We 
modify our main model (1) as follows, indexed now by subject z rather than by exam-month m, and 
collecting all the observed and unobserved student characteristics in Si:  
                                                                         (2) 
Note that each student only appears in one year and so only one time dummy is relevant. The term 
   represents the early – late gradient in exam scores in non-tournament years and (         is the 
gradient in tournament years.    18 
The  within-estimator  simply  relates  the  exam  scores  across  subjects  within-student  with  the 
timetabling  of  those  exams
15. The source of variation is simply how many of the exams were 
timetabled later in the period, and differencing the impact of that timing across tournament and 
non-tournament years.  We also   estimate a pooled version of ( 2) including observable student 
characteristics and no student fixed effects. In this,  there is  again variation across subjects and 
across years for a given subject.  
The results are in Table 6, the three columns reporting the two key coefficients of interest,     and    , 
for models with (1) just year dummies, (2) year dummies plus individual characteristics, and (3) year 
dummies and student fixed effects. As the residual error term,      is likely to be correlated across 
each pupils’ exam results, we cluster standard deviations at the individual level. The results suggest 
that typically students do better in later exams than earlier ones. This difference is significantly less 
in tournament years, the coefficient     being negative and precisely determined, confirming our 
main findings.  
e. Quantifying the effect 
 
Our  main  results  are the  difference  in  difference  analysis  in  the  later  tables.  These  are  cleanly 
identified and seem unlikely to be confounded, but the late-early difference may not be the full story 
if the early results are affected by the build-up to the tournament. The results in Table 2 give the full 
effect but are likely to be confounded by other common year effects more complex than a simple 
trend. We illustrate how the two different results relate to one another in Figure 5. This shows the 
difference  in  the  late  -  early  difference  between  tournament  and  non-tournament  years  (from 
Tables 3, 4 and 5), and the overall effect; in principle, either one could be larger depending on the 
degree of impact of the pre-tournament build up, and the fraction of late exams. We focus on the 
difference-in-difference results.  
We present the average effect and a representative high effect. The latter serves two purposes: it 
shows how affected the most affected groups are, and it allows us to address the importance of 
effort in general by asking how much do scores fall when students significantly reduce their effort. 
We present the results in terms of effect sizes (standard deviation units for student average test 
scores) and in terms of GCSE grades (counting the difference between A and B as one) for local 
policy interest. 
Our results give the impact of the tournament on the overall GCSE score, and this is the appropriate 
outcome for addressing the question of whether the exam timetable should be shifted. But for the 
                                                           
15 Recall that potential differences in the difficulty of the subject are dealt with by normalising the scores by subject.    19 
broader issue of the role of effort in the educational production function we need to focus on the 
impact of the tournament on performance in the achievement tests. And to do this we need to take 
account of the fact that the summer exams only form part of the overall grade, the rest being made 
up  of  coursework  and  continual  assessment.  For  instance,  in  English,  coursework  can  typically 
account for 40% of the overall GCSE grade. The fraction of the mark from the final summer exams 
varies by course and by year
16. Assembling information from a range of sources: 
Year 11 summer exam contribution 
Subject  %  Subject  %  Subject  % 
           
English Language  60  English Literature  70  Maths   55 – 70 
Science  50  Child Development  50  IT  40 – 50  
Languages  50  Geography  75  History  75 
Design & technology  40    Law  80  Media Studies  50 
Music  25  Physical Ed’n (gym)  50  Religious Education  75 – 100  
 
The three compulsory subjects average out to about 60% of the final mark coming from the summer 
exams, and the other subjects not that different. In this case, the direct impact of a reduction in 
student effort on exam performance is about double the regression coefficients, and this is what we 
report below.  
The results are in Table 7; column 1 doubles the coefficients from the tables specified. To get to the 
numbers in column 2, note that the dependent variable is {(pupil mean score in late exams) – (pupil 
mean score in early exams)} measured in subject-SD units. The dummy on “tournament year” means 
that the mean late exam score is lower by the coefficient in those years. The effect on the overall 
average is this number times the fraction of exams that are scheduled late, which is (1.75/7.80); we 
also convert from subject-SD units to pupil-SD units. The effect of effort on late exams is necessarily 
larger than the impact of the tournament on the overall student average grade, but the latter is non-
trivial.  
To put these numbers in perspective, we can compare to a range of policy effects (see Jacob and 
Ludwig, 2008, and Dobbie and Fryer, 2009). For example, the “Literacy Hour” intervention in England 
raised reading attainment by 0.06 SDs (Machin & McNally, 2008). A unit SD increase in teacher 
quality raises test scores by around 0.15 to 0.24 SDs per year, 0.27 in England (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin, 
Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander, 2007; Kane and Staiger, 2008;  Slater, 
Davies and Burgess, 2011). The effect of major “early years” programmes such as Head Start is 0.147 
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SDs in applied problems and 0.319 in letter identification (Currie and Thomas, 1995; Ludwig and 
Phillips, 2007). Crawford et al (2007) have shown that a student’s month of birth has effects on GCSE 
outcomes: students who have spent their entire school careers as the youngest in the class (August-
borns) score on average  0.116 SDs (girls) or 0.131 SDs (boys) lower than the oldest in the class 
(September-born students). Substantial effects on pupil progress have been found in “No Excuses” 
Charter schools, of between 0.10 - 0.40 standard deviations increase per year in mathematics and 
reading (Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2009; Angrist et al, 2010). More closely related to our focus on effort, 
Fryer (2010) and Levitt et al (2011a) show that incentivising students to raise their effort (input-
based student incentives) have an effect size of about 0.15 SDs, and Levitt et al (2011b) show that 
incentives on the day of a test can increase test scores by around 0.2 SDs. 
In  this  context,  our  results  suggest  that  effort  clearly  has  a  substantial  impact  on  student 
performance, and can have a similar effect to raising teacher quality by one SD.   
5. Conclusion 
 
We use a sharp, exogenous and repeated change in the value of leisure to identify the impact of 
student effort on educational performance. This arises from the fact that the world’s most watched 
international football tournaments overlap with the main high-stakes exam period in schools in 
England, well known to be a nation obsessed with football. We compare within-student variation in 
exam performance during the exam period between tournament and non-tournament years using 
seven years of student-subject data on practically all the students in England. This data allows us to 
bring out the heterogeneity of impact as well as quantifying the average effect.  
We find a significant negative average effect of the tournament on exam performance, substantial 
for  particular  groups.  The  mean  deterioration  in  grades  for  subjects  with  exams  during  the 
tournament  relative  to  earlier  subjects  is  0.063  SDs  of  student  performance.  Since  exams  only 
account for half of the grade on average, this means that the impact of the tournament on just the 
exams is double that at 0.12 SDs. For highly affected groups such as low ability male students from 
disadvantaged  families,  this  impact  is  over  0.2SDs.  In  the  context  of  the  range  of  effect  sizes 
reported by Jacob and Ludwig (2008), these are non-trivial amounts.  
We think of this impact arising through a reduction in student effort, with that time being spent 
instead on watching the football tournament. The variation in impact arises because of differing 
tastes  for  football,  arising  in  turn  from  cultural  norms  and  idiosyncratic  factors,  and  from  the 
differential  effectiveness  of  an  hour  of  study  on  exam  performance.  There  are  a  number  of   21 
contributory factors, worthy of further research.  Firstly, the allocation of time by children is a largely 
ignored topic by economists (Larson and Verma, 1999), but could end up being crucial to educational 
attainment. Understanding this, along with their rate of time preference, and whether they are 
maximising their utility by watching the football as opposed to revising for their examinations, will 
be  important  for  unpicking  this  relationship.  Secondly,  it  could  be  that  students’  parents  are 
watching  the  football  tournament  and  pay  less  attention  to  their  child  revising  for  their 
examinations,  which  lowers  their  encouragement  or  confidence  to  the  child  during  their 
examinations (Barnard, 2004).  
Our results relate to two issues: a broad debate on the nature of educational attainment function, 
and a policy question specific to England about the timing of summer exams.  
Taking the second first, our results show that having important exams in the tournament period 
reduces educational attainment at the median by 0.02 SDs of pupil average scores. We estimate 
much greater negative effects for male students, students from disadvantaged families and low 
ability students. These are groups that have lower performance anyway, and our results show that 
the tournament has a substantial negative effect on their performance. This in turn will affect their 
likelihood of progression through the educational system and their lifetime income. Given this, the 
benefits  of  moving  the  exams  just  a  few  weeks  earlier  in  tournament  years  are  significant.  By 
comparison, the  costs  are  likely  to  be  transient.  More  generally,  scheduling  GCSE  examinations 
during football tournaments lowers overall human capital in the UK, with implications for future 
economic growth.  
Our results carry a number of implications for our understanding of the  educational production 
function. The first is simply to note that student effort matters a lot. The coefficients directly show 
the impact on subject grades for late subjects. For strongly affected groups, this is as high as 0.1 SDs. 
As we noted above, this is the impact on the overall GCSE score, and given that exam performance is 
typically worth about half of the overall score, the impact of reduced effort in the exam period on 
the exam score will be roughly twice that, 0.2SDs. This is a very substantial effect. Obviously, it 
would be wrong to extrapolate from this number to a longer-term reduction in effort, as we have 
captured the effect of a reduction in high-value effort just before the exam. Nevertheless, comparing 
two otherwise identical students of average ability, the one putting in considerably less effort to 
their school work will perform substantially less well, at least 0.2 SDs worse, and conceivably worse 
still.   
This matters for a number of reasons. First, unlike genetic characteristics, cognitive ability or non-
cognitive traits, effort is almost immediately changeable. Our results suggest that this could have a   22 
big effect. This ties in with recent results on policies aimed at raising attainment. Fryer’s (2010), 
Jackson’s (2010) and Levitt et al’s (2011a;b) results suggest that directly paying students for greater 
effort  has  an  impact  on  test  scores.  Furthermore,  the  dramatic  test  score  gains  cited  for  “No 
Excuses” schools in the KIPP and HCZ or some Charter schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), Angrist 
et al.(2011), Fryer and Dobbie (2009))  can plausibly be interpreted as those environments eliciting 
greater effort from the students. The fact that we find changes in student effort to be very potent in 
affecting test scores suggests that policy levers to raise effort through incentives or changing school 
ethos are worth considering seriously. Such interventions would be justified if the low effort resulted 
from market failures due to lack of information on the returns to schooling, or time-inconsistent 
discounting. 
Secondly,  the  importance  of  a  manipulable  factor  such  as  effort  for  adolescents’  educational 
performance provides evidence of potentially high value policy interventions much later than “early 
years” policies. This is encouraging, offering some hope that low performing students’ trajectories in 
life can perhaps be effectively improved even after a difficult environment early in life. 
Finally, there are suggestions from neuroscience that activation of the brain's motivational circuitry 
directly affects cognitive learning processes involving many different regions throughout the brain 
(Adcock,2006; Bavelier et al. (2010); Howard-Jones (2011). If so, this means that students devoting a 
lot of time to their studies are likely to have long-lasting effects on their ability in addition to the 
immediate effects on their test scores.  
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Figure 1: Major Football Tournaments and TV viewing figures 
 
The difference in monthly TV viewing figures, June minus April. 
 
Figure 2: Annual percentage change in the percentage of pupils 
obtaining five good GCSEs  
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Figure 4: Difference-in-differences by matched groups 
Metric is subject-level SD units. 
 Standard error bars are shown in the main panel, omitted from the group ones for clarity. 
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Figure 5: Comparing the difference in difference and the total effect  
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Table 1: Data Descriptives 
 
  All  With both “late” 
and “early” 
subjects 
     
  %  % 
Male  50.15  49.27 
FSM Eligible  12.05  11.03 
SEN – non-statemented  13.48  11.40 
SEN – statemented  2.03  1.53 
Selected ethnicities
*     
White  84.64  84.05 
Black Caribbean  1.34  1.38 
Indian  2.33  2.47 
Pakistani  2.28  2.37 
     
GCSE score, normalised  -0.041  0.014 
Keystage 2 score  27.03      27.34 
     
Number of students  3,651,667  2,970,694 






Notes:  Seven years of data, 2002 – 2008. 
One cohort of students per year; final year cohort. 
* Full set used in regressions. 
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Table 2: Simple Average Differences 
 
(Mean GCSE scores in football-years) – (Mean GCSE scores in non-football-years) 
Metric is SD of student average score  
Prior 
Attainment 
  Not Eligible for FSM  Eligible for FSM  All pupils 
    Female  Male  Female   Male   
Lowest  Coeff  0.0508***  0.0357***  0.0210***  0.0146**  0.0369*** 
    (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0058)  (0.0061)  (0.0024) 
  N  482,567  541,405  124,231  122,623  1,270,826 
             
Middle  Coeff  0.0312***  0.0151***  -0.0012  -0.0105  0.0211*** 
    (0.0023)  (0.0025)  (0.0070)  (0.0076)  (0.0020) 
  N  562,183  549,089  68,469  61,583  1,241,324 
             
Highest  Coeff  -0.0206***  -0.0487***  -0.0890***  -0.1225***  -0.0419*** 
    (0.0022)  (0.0025)  (0.0094)  (0.0103)  (0.0019) 
  N  550,510  525,954  32,222  30,831  1,139,517 
             
All Pupils  Coeff  0.0133***  -0.0026  -0.0178***  -0.0258***  -0.0014 
    (0.0021)  (0.0022)  (0.0051)  (0.0054)  (0.0018) 
  N  1,595,260  1,616,448  224,922  215,037  3,651,667 
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by school.  
 * indicates significant at 10%, ** indicates significant at 5%, *** indicates significant at 1%.   
Prior attainment  groups are approximate thirds of the distribution. The boundaries of the groups are 
adjusted slightly through time as KS2 marks have trended upwards.  
The GCSE  data are detrended by subtracting a common linear time trend.  
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Table 3: Regression analysis of (late – early) difference 
 
Unit is Individual student 
Metric is subject level SD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Tournament year  -0.063***  -0.054***  -0.063***  -0.050*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Tournament year 
interacted with: 
       
Male    -0.026***    -0.025*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
FSM    -0.021***    -0.019*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Low prior attainment    -0.009***    -0.009*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
High prior attainment    -0.011***    -0.011*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
         
School Fixed effects      Y  Y 
         
Observations  2970694  2970694  2970694  2970694 
Number of schools      3283  3283 
R-squared  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Notes:   Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Dependent variable is the difference between the individual’s mean score in late subjects and early 
subjects 
Variables also included as main effects are: pupil gender, ethnicity, FSM status, SEN status, prior 
attainment, and location, plus year dummies.  Only a selection of interactions are shown.  
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Table 4: Group difference-in-differences 
  
Metric is subject-level SD 
Prior 
Attainment 
  Not Eligible for FSM  Eligible for FSM  All pupils 
    Female  Male  Female   Male   
Lowest  Coeff  -0.0584***  -0.0679***  -0.0649***  -0.1077***  -0.0680*** 
    (0.0032)  (0.0035)  (0.0057)  (0.0065)  (0.0029) 
  N  374,455  396,640  89,888  82,763  943,746 
             
Middle  Coeff  -0.0253***  -0.0740***  -0.0208***  -0.0993***  -0.0495*** 
    (0.0027)  (0.0031)  (0.0060)  (0.0074)  (0.0025) 
  N  471,834  445,225  54,480  46,750  1,018,289 
             
Highest  Coeff  -0.0343***  -0.0661***  -0.0385***  -0.0755***  -0.0507*** 
    (0.0027)  (0.0028)  (0.0075)  (0.0082)  (0.0023) 
  N  488,550  466,204  27,816  26,089  1,008,659 
             
All Pupils  Coeff  -0.0385***  -0.0680***  -0.0471***  -0.0991***  -0.0556*** 
    (0.0022)  (0.0025)  (0.0043)  (0.0050)  (0.0021) 
  N  1,334,839  1,308,069  172,184  155,602  2,970,694 
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by school 
 * indicates significant at 10%, ** indicates significant at 5%, *** indicates significant at 1%.   
Prior attainment  groups are approximate thirds of the distribution. The boundaries of the groups are 
adjusted slightly through time as KS2 marks have trended upwards.  
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Table 5: Quantiles of differences-in-differences for matched school-
groups 
 
Metric is subject-level SD 
  {(Late – early) in tournament} - {(Late – early) in non- tournament}  
   p5  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  p95 
All Pupils  -0.3307  -0.2570  -0.1531  -0.0486  0.0577  0.1571  0.2150 
               
Male  -0.3571  -0.2846  -0.1756  -0.0628  0.0489  0.1531  0.2134 
               
FSM  -0.4215  -0.3556  -0.2247  -0.0339  0.1017  0.2251  0.2546 
               
Low ability  -0.4006  -0.3170  -0.1854  -0.0495  0.0814  0.1965  0.2632 
Middle ability  -0.3380  -0.2711  -0.1579  -0.0457  0.0731  0.1792  0.2407 
High ability  -0.2987  -0.2374  -0.1444  -0.0491  0.0477  0.1364  0.1912 
Notes:  These figures are based on school-group matching.  For all pupils, there are 14,940 school-groups.  
School-groups are only included if there are at least 20 students within the school-group in both tournament 
and non-tournament years. Quantiles of the distribution of the following statistic are reported:  
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Table 6: Student*subject fixed effect regression results 
 
Observation = student*subject 
Metric is subject-level SD 
Observation = student*subject 
Metric is subject-level SD 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Proportion of exams within subject which 
are “late” 
0.068***  0.103***  0.126*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Proportion of exams within subject which 
are “late” * Year is a tournament year 
-0.007***  -0.009***  -0.009*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
Year dummies  Y  Y   
Student Characteristics    Y   
Student fixed effects      Y 
       
Number of observations  25,705,081  25,705,081  25,705,081 
Number of pupils  3,651,667  3,651,667  3,651,667 
Notes:   1. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at student level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3. “Late” is defined by calendar date for all years, and coincides with the tournament dates; see text 
for details 
4. Student characteristics are: gender, ethnicity, month of birth, poverty status, SEN status, English as 
additional language, prior ability measures (Keystage 2 English score, Keystage 2 maths score, 
Keystage 2 Science score) 
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Table 7: Quantifying the Results: Other Metrics 
 









Difference in difference        
Table 3       
Mean (col. 3)  -0.126   -0.015   -0.208  
Poor, male, white, low 
attainment (col. 4) 
-0.206   -0.025   -0.347  
Table 5         
All pupils, (median)  -0.116   -0.014   -0.194  
All pupils, (p10)  -0.202   -0.025   -0.347  
Male pupils, (median)  -0.140   -0.017   -0.236  
Male pupils, (p10)  -0.216   -0.026   -0.361  
Notes:  Column 1 = coefficient * 2 
Column 2  = column 1* (1.76/7.80)*(11.54/10.68) {share of late exams}*{converting subject 
sd to pupil sd} 
  Column 3 = column 2*(10.68/6)*7.80 {converting to gcse points} {converting to letter 








      39 
Appendix Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1: The football tournaments from 2002 to 2008 
Year  Host country  Tournament 
Did England 
qualify? 
Start date  End date 
2002 
South Korea and 
Japan 
World Cup  Yes  31st May  30th June 




th June  4
th July 
2006  Germany  World Cup  Yes  9












Appendix Table 2: The examination dates from 2002 to 2008 





% of exams during 
football 
2002  Yes  13th May  28th June  61% 
2003  No  12th May  27th June  - 
2004  Yes  17th May  30th June  49% 
2005  No  16th May  30th June  - 
2006  Yes  15th May  28th June  48% 
2007  No  14th May  27th June  - 
2008  Yes  13th May  25th June  46% 
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Appendix Table 3: Subjects that do and do not have overlap with the football tournaments in 
2002, 2004 and 2006  
2002  2002  2002 
Subjects that have no exams during the 
football 
Subjects that have some exams during the 
football 
Subjects that have all their exams during the 
football 
D&T automobile studies  Biology  Economics 
Drama  Business Studies  Greek 
English Lit  Chemistry  History 
Geography  Classical civilisation  Home economics 
German  D&T Electronics  Information Technology 
Health studies  D&T Food  Physics 
Humanities  D&T Graphics  Psychology 
Information Studies  D&T Industrial  Social Science 
Music  D&T Resistant Materials  Sociology 
Persian  D&T Systems and Control Technology    
Physical Education  D&T Textiles Technology    
   French    
   English Language    
   Latin    
   Mathematics    
   Portuguese    
   Religious Studies    
   Religious Education    
   Science (both double and single)    
   Turkish    
     
2004  2004  2004 
Subjects that have no exams during the 
football 
Subjects that have some exams during the 
football 
Subjects that have all their exams during the 
football 
Applied ICT  Biblical Hebrew  Applied Business 
Applied Science  Biology  Chemistry 
Business and communication systems  Business Studies  Classical Civilisation 
Citizenship studies  D&T Electronics  Classical Greek 
D&T Systems and Control technology  D&T Food  Economics 
Drama  D&T Graphics  History 
Engineering  D&T Industrial  Home economics 
Geography  D&T Resistant Materials  Leisure and Tourism 
German  D&T Textiles Technology  Media Studies 
Health and Social Care  English Language  Physics 
Humanities  English Lit  Psychology 
ICT  French  Sociology 
Latin  Mathematics    
Manufacturing  Religious Studies    
Music  Science (both double and single)    
Persian       
Physical Education       
Portuguese       
Rural and Agricultural Science       
Spanish       
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2006  2006  2006 
Subjects that have no exams during the 
football 
Subjects that have some exams during the 
football 
Subjects that have all their exams during the 
football 
Applied ICT  Biblical Hebrew  Applied Business 
Applied Science  Biology  Chemistry 
Business and communication systems  Business Studies  Classical Civilisation 
Citizenship studies  D&T Electronics  Classical Greek 
D&T Systems and Control technology  D&T Food  Economics 
Drama  D&T Graphics  History 
Engineering  D&T Industrial  Home economics 
Geography  D&T Resistant Materials  Leisure and Tourism 
German  D&T Textiles Technology  Media Studies 
Health and Social Care  English Language  Physics 
Humanities  English Lit  Psychology 
ICT  French  Sociology 
Latin  Mathematics    
Manufacturing  Religious Studies    
Music  Science (both double and single)    
Persian       
Physical Education       
Portuguese       
Rural and Agricultural Science       
Spanish       
Turkish       
 
Appendix Table 4: Football programmes in the top 10 most viewed programmes 
Channel and 
programme rank 
for that week 
Week ending and programme  Viewers (millions) 
2002     
BBC1  w/e 9
th June 2002   
2  WORLD CUP 2002: ARGENTINA V ENGLAND (FRI 1230)  12 
5  WORLD CUP 2002: POST-MATCH (FRI 1420)  10.49 
BBC1  w/e 16
th June 2002   
2  WORLD CUP 2002: ENGLAND V DENMARK (SAT 1230)  12.47 
4  WORLD CUP 2002: ENGLAND V NIGERIA (WED 0730)  12.22 
7  WORLD CUP 2002: POSTMATCH (SAT 1420)  8.85 
9  WORLD CUP 2002: SPAIN V IRELAND (SUN 1230)  7.77 
BBC1  w/e 23
rd June 2002   
1  WORLD CUP 2002: ENGLAND V BRAZIL (FRI 0730)  12.46 
6  WORLD CUP 2002: POST-MATCH (FRI 0920)  9.77 
BBC1  w/e 30
th June 2002   
4  WORLD CUP 2002: GERMANY V BRAZIL (SUN 1200)  10.08 
7  WORLD CUP 2002: POST MATCH (SUN 1350)  8.95 
2004     
BBC1  w/e 13
th June 2004   
7  EURO 2004: SPA V RUS (SAT 1945)  6.4 
8  EURO 2004: PORT V GRC (SAT 1700)  6.19 
ITV1  13
th June 2004   
1  EURO 2004 FRA V ENG (SUN 1944)  17.8 
BBC1  w/e 20
th June 2004   
4  EURO 2004: SPA V PORT (SUN 1945)  8.78 
5  EURO 2004: GER V NETH (TUE 1945)  7.95 
6  EURO 2004: CRO V FRA (THU 1946)  7.55 
7  EURO 2004: POST-MATCH (THU 2135)  7.23 
8  EURO 2004: POST-MATCH (SUN 2135)  6.85 
9  EURO 2004: NETH V CZECH (SAT 1945)  6.74 
ITV1  w/e 20
th June 2004     42 
1  EURO 2004 ENG V SWI (THU 1659)  14.31 
BBC1  w/e 27
th June 2004   
1  EURO 2004: POR V ENG (THU 1945)  20.66 
2  EURO 2004: CRO V ENG (MON 1945)  18.28 
3  EURO 2004: POST-MATCH (MON 2136)  14.48 
4  EURO 2004: POST-MATCH (THU 2229)  14.22 
5  EURO 2004: PREMATCH (THU 1929)  11.71 
7  EURO 2004: PREMATCH (MON 1929)  9.83 
ITV1  w/e 27
th June 2004    
4  EURO 2004 GER V CZE (WED 1944)  8.28 
9  EURO 2004 SWE V NETH (SAT 1945)  7.04 
2006     
BBC1  w/e 4
th June 2006   
1  MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (TUE 1958)  9.29 
BBC1  w/e 11
th June 2006   
1  WORLD CUP 2006: ENG V PAR (SAT 1400)  12 
2  WORLD CUP 2006: POST-MATCH (SAT 1551)  9.29 
10  WORLD CUP 2006: GER V CRI (FRI 1701)  5.65 
BBC1  w/e 18
th June 2006   
1  WORLD CUP 2006: BRA V CRO (TUE 2000)  9.64 
2  WORLD CUP 2006: GER V POL (WED 2000)  8.11 
4  WORLD CUP 2006: POST-MATCH (WED 2149)  6.74 
5  WORLD CUP 2006: ITA V GHA (MON 2000)  6.69 
8  WORLD CUP 2006: POST-MATCH (SUN 2151)  6.39 
9  WORLD CUP 2006: POST-MATCH (TUE 2151)  6.38 
10  WORLD CUP 2006: FRA V KOR (SUN 2000)  6.17 
ITV1  w/e 18
th June 2006   
1  WORLD CUP 06: ENG V TRI (THU 1650)  13.67 
5  WORLD CUP 06: BRA V AUS (SUN 1658)  8.08 
10  WORLD CUP 06: SWE V PAR (THU 1959)  6.63 
BBC1  w/e 25
th June 2006   
1  WORLD CUP 2006: ENG V ECU (SUN 1600)  16.29 
2  WORLD CUP 2006: POST-MATCH (SUN 1750)  13.45 
3  WORLD CUP 2006: ARG V MEX (SAT 2000)  8.46 
4  WORLD CUP 2006: JAP V BRA (THU 2000)  7.81 
10  WORLD CUP 2006: PREMATCH (SUN 1529)  7.44 
ITV1  w/e 25
th June 2006   
1  WORLD CUP 06 (TUE 1950)  18.46 
3  WORLD CUP 06 (WED 1958)  8.74 
7  WORLD CUP 06 (SUN 1958)  7.43 
9  WORLD CUP 06: PREMATCH (TUE 1903)  6.7 
2008     
BBC1  w/e 15
th June 2008   
10  EURO 2008: MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (FRI 1929)  5.58 
ITV1  w/e 15
th June 2008   
10  EURO 2008 LIVE (MON 1929)  5.74 
BBC1  w/e 22
nd June 2008   
4  EURO 2008: MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (SUN 1930)  7.21 
5  EURO 2008: MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (TUE 1929)  6.29 
7  EURO 2008: MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (FRI 1929)  5.64 
ITV1  w/e 22
nd June 2008   
3  EURO 2008 LIVE (SAT 1929)  7.37 
5  EURO 2008 LIVE (THU 1929)  6.89 
BBC1  w/e 29
th June 2008   
1  EURO 2008: MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (SUN 1856)  8.84 
6  EURO 2008: MATCH OF THE DAY LIVE (WED 1929)  6.95 
ITV1  w/e 29
th June 2008   
6  EURO 2008 LIVE (THU 1929)  6.77 
 
 